Lunar Refueling: Legal Issues and Suggested Solutions

The establishment of settlements and economic activities on the Moon is expected to occur in the near future, positioning the Moon as a critical hub for continued exploration of the Solar System. Central to this development is the creation of a lunar refueling industry, which will play a pivotal role in supporting lunar activities and fostering further exploration.

Lunar refueling, which includes extracting local resources like lunar ice water to obtain hydrogen, offers key benefits, such as reducing the need for resupply missions from Earth, lowering launch costs, extending mission capabilities, and enabling launches from the Moon, which are more cost-effective due to the Moon’s lower gravitational pull. While lunar refueling is expected to empower the lunar economy and transform the Moon into a gateway for deep-space missions, facilitating exploration of destinations like Mars and asteroids, it also raises legal and environmental concerns.

This Paper does not address environmental concerns; it focuses instead on some of the legal questions, arising particularly under the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”), discussing potential implications of Articles II, IX, and XII OST on lunar refueling, and arguing the issues are manageable. Further, the Paper examines the possibility of conflicts arising from competition for prime locations and potential interference.

Given the current unlikelihood of negotiating new treaties or amending existing ones, this Paper advocates for the development of industry-sponsored guidelines for the lunar refueling industry to foster common practices, incorporate ethical standards, ensure compliance with the OST, and promote safer operations.

The Paper also advocates for voluntary cooperation among stakeholders, in the form of shared facilities, resource pooling, and network contracts, arguing that these instruments–besides promoting efficiency–can also help foster compliance with the OST, enhance coordination, and mitigate the risk of conflicts. The proposed guidelines and the suggested cooperative and coordinated solutions may also be environmentally beneficial and foster sustainability.

Introduction

Lunar settlements, orbital habitats, and economic activities are anticipated to take place relatively soon in cislunar and lunar space.1Scott Pace, Space Policy Edition: Why Lunar Exploration Must Be of Enduring National Interest, Planetary Soc’y (Aug. 4, 2023), https://www.planetary.org/planetary-radio/lunar-exploration-enduring-national-interest. This will mark a shift in humanity’s approach to space exploration, with the Moon becoming a key hub for the continued exploration of the Solar System.2PwC, Lunar Market Assessment: Perspectives on a Future Lunar Economy (Nov. 2021), https://www.pwc.fr/en/industrie/secteur-spatial/pwc-space-team-public-reports-and-articles/lunar-market-assessment.html. According to a Lockheed Martin white paper, flourishing international community will exist on the Moon by the 2040s, driven by its role as a testing ground and resource hub for human expansion into the Solar System.3 Lockheed Martin, A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space: Water-Based Lunar Architecture Novella White Paper 4 (2024), https://lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/space/documents/lunar-architecture/Lockheed%20Martin%27s%20Water-Based%20Lunar%20Architecture%20Novella%20White%20Paper.pdf (presents technical concepts of the emerging lunar economy through a fictional yet plausible scenario set in the 2040s “novella”, crafting the story from the perspective of an imaginary lunar contractor”) [hereinafter A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space]. The Moon’s harsh environment presents ideal conditions for preparing technology and procedures for Mars exploration, while its resources may support sustainable operations in deep space, reducing dependence on expensive Earth launches.4Id. By the 2040s, lunar resource development may even bring value back to Earth orbit.5Id. Finally, the white paper’s authors imagine the development of a “large cryogenic propellant refinery and depot” on stable orbit around the Moon, and more.6Id. at 5.

While this vision is, of course, speculative, it is grounded in credible projections,7PwC, supra note 2. aligned with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (“NASA”) “Moon to Mars” architecture8 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 1. and the “Artemis Program.”9See Artemis, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/artemis (last visited Mar. 24, 2025). While the precise scope of the Artemis Program might have become less certain in light of shifting programmatic and budgetary priorities under the Trump Administration,10In its fiscal year 2026 budget proposal released in May 2025, the Trump Administration proposed major changes to NASA’s Artemis campaign, including ending the Lunar Gateway program and retiring the Orion spacecraft and Space Launch System (SLS) after Artemis III, citing high costs (reportedly billion per launch) and budget overruns of approximately 140%. See Joey Roulette, NASA Rocket, Lunar Station, Many Science Programs Face Cuts in Trump 2026 Budget, Reuters (May 2, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nasa-rocket-lunar-station-many-science-programs-face-cuts-trump-2026-budget-2025-05-02. However, this does not necessarily indicate that the Artemis Program is losing momentum. The Administration characterizes the shift not as a retreat, but as a transition to a more sustainable, commercially driven model for lunar and Mars exploration, with increased funding, streamlined mission architecture, and renewed emphasis on innovation and international collaboration. See NASA, President Trump’s FY26 Budget Revitalizes Human Space Exploration, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/president-trumps-fy26-budget-revitalizes-human-space-exploration (last visited May 29, 2025). proposals of Lockheed Martin’s engineers are not entirely dependent on Artemis. One of the white paper’s major pillars lies in building a water-based propulsion economy centered on hydrogen and oxygen sourced from lunar ice, independent of Artemis,11 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3. but also, more generally, the authors envision a multi-stakeholder lunar economy, anticipating commercial actors, international partnerships, and private logistics chains, which can function regardless of Artemis continuity.12Id. This is not to say that the Artemis Program’s scaling back might not lead to delays or restructuring, particularly with respect to large-scale infrastructure, as commercial entities remain heavily dependent on government support. A contraction in public spending could significantly slow progress.13Some skepticism remains regarding the near-term emergence of a genuinely private lunar market, given that commercial space companies continue to derive the majority of their revenue from government contracts. For example, while companies like Intuitive Machines are generating income, most of it comes from NASA awards and related public funding. This dependence raises concerns about the commercial sector’s ability to maintain momentum independently, particularly if public programs like Artemis are scaled back, potentially leading to delays or restructuring in planned infrastructure. See e.g., Jeff Foust, The Search for a Commercial Lunar Economy, Space Rev. (Nov. 25, 2024), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4723/1. On the other hand, predictions are hard to make, as for example national security needs might cause contracts with the Department of Defense to take the place of NASA’s contracts.14NASA is not expected to remain the only anchor customer. Other U.S. government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense and DARPA, are beginning to shape the contours of the emerging lunar economy. Defense-driven initiatives, such as DARPA’s LunA-10 and the U.S. Space Force’s CHPS and Oracle programs, suggest that national security interests could play a major role in financing lunar infrastructure, especially in areas such as communications, navigation, logistics, and space domain awareness. See, e.g., Hope Hodge Seck, Why Space Force Wants to Patrol Around the Moon, Military.com (Apr. 2, 2022), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/04/02/why-space-force-wants-patrol-around-moon.html; Press Release, DARPA, A Framework for Optimized, Integrated Lunar Infrastructure, LunA-10 (Aug. 15, 2023), https://www.darpa.mil/news/2023/lunar-infrastructure-framework; Sandra Erwin, Air Force Research Laboratory Delays Lunar Experiment, SpaceNews (Sept. 15, 2023), https://spacenews.com/air-force-research-laboratory-delays-lunar-experiment/; Sandra Erwin, Air Force Research Laboratory Delays Lunar Experiment, SpaceNews (Sept. 15, 2023), https://spacenews.com/air-force-research-laboratory-delays-lunar-experiment.

Most importantly, visions of lunar development, such as Lockheed Martin’s, include establishing a sustainable lunar refueling industry, crucial for supporting activities on the Moon and further exploration. This capability will significantly reduce reliance on costly Earth-based resupply missions, extend mission capacities, allow for launches from the Moon – where reduced gravitational forces make launches significantly more economical – and finally, it will advance deep-space missions.15See, e.g., Manny Shar, In-orbit Refuelling: Propelling Humanitys Future in Space, TechUK (Sept. 20, 2023) https://www.techuk.org/resource/in-orbit-refuelling-propelling-humanity-s-future-in-space.html.

A number of governments have already acknowledged that the ability to refuel on orbit is pivotal for space activities,16See, e.g., White House, National Science and Technology Council, National In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing Implementation Plan 5 (2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/NATIONAL-ISAM-IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN.pdf [hereinafter ISAM Implementation Plan]. and that lunar refueling services for satellites, launch vehicles, landers, rovers, and other space objects are integral components of In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (“ISAM”).17White House, National Science and Technology Council, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy 6 (Apr. 2022), https://web.archive.org/web/20250116081814/https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/04-2022-ISAM-National-Strategy-Final.pdf [hereinafter ISAM Strategy]. Central to the establishment of a lunar refueling industry will be fuel extraction and storage; harvesting lunar resources, particularly extracting hydrogen from lunar ice water,18 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 8. which provoke pressing environmental and legal concerns, particularly regarding the application of the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”).19Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].

Leaving to others a full discussion of environmental concerns, this paper focuses on legal issues. Part II discusses the implications of Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies, and explores the repercussions this prohibition could have on resource extraction for fuel production and argues that the best interpretation of the Treaty’s Article II is that appropriation and use of these resources are not prohibited. Further, Part II considers potential implications for establishing facilities connected to refueling services (e.g., fuel depots), which could imply de facto appropriation of lunar ground, if this means excluding others or asserting priority over certain locations. The Paper argues that the OST’s other provisions, particularly Article XII, might support the legality of these facilities – even if they exclude others. Next, Part II explores the implications of the “due regard” and “harmful interference” provisions found in Article IX OST on the establishment of a refueling industry and further discusses how the refueling industry could compete over resource-rich areas or prime refueling locations (e.g., stable orbits), potentially causing conflicts.

As in the current geopolitical environment, new treaties or amendments to existing ones are highly unlikely,20The likelihood of new multilateral agreements continues to erode. See, e.g., Stephen Wertheim, Trump’s Foreign Policy and the Second American Revolution, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace (Mar. 20, 2025), https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/03/trump-foreign-policy-second-american-revolution-nato-un (arguing that the U.S. is turning away from the “logic of multilateralism” and embracing a more unilateral approach to foreign policy). Also, renewed multilateralism is increasingly implausible because of the position of both Russia and China. See, e.g., Roderick Kefferpütz, China and Russia: United in Opposition, Mercator Institute for China Studies (June 16, 2022), https://merics.org/de/kommentar/china-and-russia-united-opposition (arguing that China and Russia’s joint communiqués now regularly identify the U.S. as a shared security threat, their relationship is increasingly defined by systemic opposition to Western liberal norms, they actively cooperate in frontier domains such as cyberspace, outer space, and the Arctic, and concluding that a U.S. rapprochement with either country is “very unlikely”). Part III advocates for alternative mechanisms, such as voluntary guidelines for lunar refueling operations, which could offer a viable pathway to a peaceful, safe, and sustainable lunar refueling industry by establishing clear principles, ethical standards, and defined responsibilities. Part III also suggests lunar stakeholders to adopt frameworks of cooperative models, such as shared facilities and network contracts, which would further foster sustainability and facilitate compliance with the OST. Implementing cooperative operations in these forms, in fact, could help address legal issues (for example avoid exclusive or uncoordinated occupation of land) and allow companies to collaborate effectively, adopt common standards and achieve technological advancements. These approaches could align operations of lunar refueling with international space law principles and reduce the risk of conflicts; their implementation could also help address the inevitable environmental challenges arising from the lunar refueling industry and increase its sustainability.

I. In-space and Lunar Refueling Projects; Advantages of Lunar Refueling

A. In-Space Refueling Projects

In-space refueling technology will be established to meet different objectives within Earth’s orbit and on the Moon. Currently, there are numerous projects in development to explore or enable future refueling capabilities in the lunar environment, and even more regarding in Earth’s orbit.21Daria Malyh, et al., A Brief Review on In-Orbit Refueling Projects and Critical Techniques, 5 Aerospace Systems 185, 185–96 (2022). As an example, Creare LLC – an engineering research and development firm that has operated for several decades in the field of advanced fluid and thermal management systems for space applications – is developing a compact, high-efficiency compressor to enable the transfer of gaseous propellants (e.g., hydrogen and oxygen) between tanks in microgravity, under contract with NASA. See Compressor for Efficient On-Orbit Gas Transfer, Nasa Techport, https://techport.nasa.gov/view/154478 (last visited May 30, 2025). While Earth-orbit refueling22Examples include Northrop Grumman’s Passive Refueling Module (PRM) and Geosynchronous Auxiliary Support Tanker (GAS-T). See Northrop Grumman Satellite-Refueling Technology Selected as First Preferred Refueling Solution Interface Standard for Space Systems Command (SSC), Northrop Grumman Newsroom (Jan. 29, 2024), https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-satellite-refueling-technology-selected-as-first-preferred-refueling-solution-interface-standard-for-space-systems-command-ssc-6899294. focuses on extending satellite lifespans and enhancing maneuverability in geostationary orbits, lunar refueling aims to support broader objectives of space exploration, enabling sustainable lunar operations and the development of a cislunar economy, laying the groundwork for deeper exploration of the Solar System.23 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3; see also infra Part I(B).

The Lockheed Martin’s white paper envisions lunar refueling facilitating both lunar and interplanetary missions coordinated through a network of orbital bases,24Id. at 5. including NASA’s lunar Gateway station (whose future is now uncertain following the White House’s proposal to cancel it),25Will Shanklin, The White House’s Proposed Budget Would Cancel NASA’s Gateway Space Station Project, Engadget (May 2, 2025), https://www.engadget.com/science/space/the-white-houses-proposed-budget-would-cancel-nasas-gateway-space-station-project-201459838.html (reporting that the White House’s proposed budget calls for terminating NASA’s Gateway space station project and for phasing out the SLS rocket and Orion capsule after Artemis III). The Gateway had already drawn criticism from multiple sides as an unnecessary and costly component of the space program. See, e.g., Gerald Black, Redirecting NASA’s Focus: Why the Gateway Program Should Be Cancelled, Space Rev. (Feb. 10, 2025), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4935/1; Sarah Scoles, Gateway: The 21st-Century Moonshot Mission, Undark (Jan. 22, 2025), https://undark.org/2025/01/22/gateway-the-21st-century-moonshot-mission. with commercial habitats, a cryogenic propellant refinery, and a depot for lunar-derived materials bound for Earth.26 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 5. Serving as an “entry ramp” for an interplanetary highway, this setup enables refueling, cargo transfer, and crew staging for Mars missions.27Id. The infrastructure supports sustainable lunar and Martian operations, with refueling stations enabling regular missions to Mars and a Martian depot producing propellant from water, thus facilitating further exploration of the Solar System.28Id.

Momentum is building around in-orbit and lunar refueling, despite some challenges,29NASA has recently canceled the billion OSAM-1 project, intended to test satellite refueling and servicing in orbit, after poor performance by its contractor, Maxar. See Michael Sheetz, NASA shuts down billion satellite refueling project after contractor Maxar is criticized for poor performance, CNBC (Mar. 1, 2024). The OSAM-1 mission, initiated in 2015 to dock with and refuel Landsat 7, encountered extensive delays and cost overruns attributed to Maxar’s underestimation of the project’s complexity and lack of sufficient expertise. and recent U.S. government initiatives further demonstrate this trend. The U.S. Space Force (“USSF”) is cautiously exploring refueling servicing to potentially extend satellite lifespan and improve satellite maneuverability, conducting cost-benefit studies and limited prototype projects before committing to large-scale investments.30The Commander of Space Systems Command (SSC) – which is the US Space Force’s primary acquisition organization – indicated that refueling could become a requirement for future satellites to extend lifespan and improve maneuverability. USSF’s current efforts include a million contract with Astroscale to develop a refueling vehicle by 2026, though the sustainability of a commercial servicing market remains uncertain without consistent military demand. Theresa Hitchens, Space Force Taking the Long View of Satellite Servicing, With an Industry in the Balance, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/space-force-taking-the-long-view-of-satellite-servicing-with-an-industry-in-the-balance (May 28, 2024). Further, the USSF has cooperated with the U.S. Department of Defense in supporting commercial refueling initiatives such as Orbit Fab’s RAFTI system and GRIP interface, both of which are now approved as standard technologies.31See., e.g., Clarence Oxford, Space Force Endorses Orbit Fab’s RAFTI as Standard for Satellite Refueling, Space Daily (Aug. 6, 2024), https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Space_Force_Endorses_Orbit_Fabs_RAFTI_as_Standard_for_Satellite_Refueling_999.html. USSF Approves Orbit Fab’s RAFTI as Accepted Refueling Interface for Military Satellites, Sat News (Aug. 6, 2024), https://news.satnews.com/2024/08/06/ussf-approves-orbit-fabs-rafti-as-accepted-refueling-interface-for-military-satellites. Under the ROOSTER program, USSF also selected Space Logistics’ Active Refueling Module for further development and integration.32See e.g., Sandra Erwin, Defense Innovation Unit Awards Three Contracts for Space Logistics Technologies, Space News (Mar. 20, 2024), https://spacenews.com/defense-innovation-unit-awards-three-contracts-for-space-logistics-technologies. Finally, the USSF’s innovation arm, SpaceWERX, has awarded to CisLunar Industries a contract for creating a sustainable propulsion ecosystem that repurposes metal debris in space as fuel.33CisLunar Industries, Astroscale U.S., Colorado State University, and Neumann Space Awarded .7M Contract by the U.S. Space Force, CisLunar Industries (Feb. 22, 2023), https://www.cislunarindustries.com/post/cislunar-industries-astroscale-u-s-and-colorado-state-university-awarded-1-7m-contract-by-the-u-s-space-force (announcing a SpaceWERX-funded initiative in collaboration with Astroscale U.S., Colorado State University, and Neumann Space to develop a sustainable propulsion system using recycled space debris as fuel). NASA continues to advance cryogenic fluid handling technologies34Cryogenic Fluid Management, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/space-technology-mission-directorate/tdm/cryogenic-fluid-management-cfm (last visited March 24, 2025). and in 2024 supported an in-flight propellant transfer test on Starship.35Lee Mohon, NASA Artemis Mission Progresses with SpaceX Starship Test Flight, NASA (Mar. 14, 2024), https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/esdmd/artemis-campaign-development-division/human-landing-system-program/nasa-artemis-mission-progresses-with-spacex-starship-test-flight.

Moreover, several companies are actively developing technologies for propellant production and refueling in orbit and on the Moon. First, Orion Space Solutions is working with USSF on refuellable satellite platforms through the Tetra-5 and Tetra-6 programs, advancing on-orbit refueling capabilities, all specifically intended for operations in geostationary orbit (“GEO”).36Orion Space Solutions to Expand Its Work Demonstrating Refueling in Space Capabilities for U.S. Space Force, PR Newswire (Nov. 19, 2024, 9:00), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/orion-space-solutions-to-expand-its-work-demonstrating-refueling-in-space-capabilities-for-us-space-force-302309466.html (explaining that The Tetra-6 SmallSat prototype, currently in development and slated for launch in 2027, just two years after Tetra-5, scheduled for late 2025, will demonstrate a new refueling method. Both spacecrafts are designed for at least two years of operation in GEO). Upon launch, Orion will become the first company to field technologies demonstrating satellite refueling at GEO and to host the full range of commercial refueling mechanisms.37Id.

Secondly, Blue Origin has unveiled the “Blue Ring,” a proposed spacecraft platform with robust refueling capabilities designed to support in-space logistics and delivery for both commercial and government missions from medium Earth orbit to the cislunar region and beyond.38Blue Origin Unveils Multi-Mission, Multi-Orbit Space Mobility Platform, Blue Origin (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.blueorigin.com/news/blue-origin-unveils-space-mobility-platform (explaining that the platform aims to reduce operational costs and increase mission flexibility–thus advancing space infrastructure, mobility, and sustainability–and plans to robust refueling capabilities, enabling spacecraft to extend their lifespan and maneuverability through on-orbit refueling.). With NASA’s support, Blue Origin also leads the Blue Alchemist project, an initiative aimed at manufacturing solar cells directly on the Moon using lunar regolith and extracting essential elements like iron, silicon, and aluminum, with oxygen as a byproduct, which can be used for life support and as an oxidizer in rocket propulsion systems.39Blue Alchemist to Make Solar cells on the Moon Using Moondust, New Atlas, https://newatlas.com/space/blue-alchemist-moon-dust-solar-cells/#gallery:3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2024). Further yet, Blue Origin has unveiled another project focused on propellant production, the “Lunar Polar Propellant Mining Outpost,” which involves deploying landers (e.g., Blue Moon vehicle) to lunar polar regions rich in water-ice and using solar power to extract and process ice into hydrogen and oxygen propellants.40Loura Hall, Lunar Polar Propellant Mining Outpost (LPMO): A Breakthrough for Lunar Exploration & Industry, NASA (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/general/lunar-polar-propellant-mining-outpost-lpmo-a-breakthrough-for-lunar-exploration-industry.

Thirdly, I-space and Orbit Fab (a provider of in-space refueling services) have agreed to collaborate on propellant harvesting and delivery for lunar missions,41Debra Werner, Orbit Fab and ispace to Collaborate on Lunar Propellant Harvesting and Delivery, SpaceNews (Dec. 11, 2023). while recently Orbit Fab has joined forces with Astroport Space Technologies, a company specializing in lunar infrastructure, to accelerate the development of in-situ resource utilization (“ISRU”) systems for extracting and processing lunar regolith into essential resources, including propellants.42Astroport and Orbit Fab Join Forces for Lunar Exploration Breakthrough (Oct. 18, 2024), SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/astroport-and-orbit-fab-join-forces-for-lunar-exploration-breakthrough.

Lastly, in collaboration with NASA, SKYRE and Eta Space are developing an autonomous, commercial Lunar Propellant Production Plant (LP3) to enable lunar refueling, focusing on producing liquid hydrogen and oxygen from lunar resources to support sustainable space exploration.43Advancing Sustainability in Space and On Earth, Skyre Inc. (June 22, 2022), https://www.skyre-inc.com/news/advancing-sustainability-in-space-and-on-earth. Eta Space is advancing several projects focused on the Moon and Mars through local production of essential propellants and consumables – using lunar polar resources like water and sunlight, the Lunar Propellant Production Plant (LPPP) aims to produce, liquefy, and store hydrogen and oxygen propellants to refuel reusable lunar landers, surface transport, and life support equipment. Eta Space is also developing a liquid oxygen refueling station deployable across the lunar surface – the Lunar Oxygen Station (LOS) – for propulsion and life support by converting lunar regolith, deployable across the lunar surface. For this purpose, Eta Space is building ISRU capacity, developing methods like residual scavenging, resource prospecting, and cryogenic liquefaction.44Eta Space, Lunar, https://etaspace.com/lunar (last visited Oct. 31, 2024).

The selected examples above illustrate that numerous projects are underway in the space refueling sector; thus, while lunar refueling remains in its developmental phase, there are multiple pathways through which it could become a reality.

B. Advantages of Lunar Refueling

Both in-Earth-orbit refueling and lunar refueling offer undeniable advantages,45Manny Shar, How Orbital Refueling Will Unlock Humanity’s Potential in Space, Space Rev. (October 2, 2023), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4660/1. but the list of benefits of the two types of refueling activities differs. In-orbit refueling enhances satellite efficiency and longevity,46Satellites often become inoperative due to fuel depletion. Refueling them in orbit can significantly prolong their operational life, delaying the need for costly replacements. See Malyh, et al., supra note 21. improves satellite maneuverability,47With the ability to refuel, satellites can perform more frequent and complex maneuvers, such as avoiding collisions with space debris or adjusting orbits to optimize mission objectives. See., e.g., Daniel Faber et al., Refuellable Satellites Offer Critical Edge Amidst Intensifying Threats in Space, Space News (July 16, 2024), https://spacenews.com/refuellable-satellites-offer-critical-edge-amidst-intensifying-threats-space. provides cost efficiency,48Developing and launching new satellites is expensive; refueling existing ones reduces the need for new investments, offering a more economical solution. See, e.g., Izzy House, The Great Debate: Refueling vs. Deorbiting, SpaceCom Expo (Oct. 14, 2024), https://www.spacecomexpo.com/spacecom-column/great-debate-refueling-vs-deorbiting. supports other in-space services,49Refueling capabilities are integral to the emerging in-space servicing market, which includes satellite repair, upgrading, and repositioning, thereby fostering a more sustainable space economy. See, e.g., Nilopal Ojha, Orbital Refueling Represents a Growth Opportunity for In-Space Services, Satellite Today (Mar. 28, 2022). and offers strategic flexibility for military operations.50For military and defense applications, refueled satellites can maintain or alter positions as needed, providing a tactical advantage in military operations. See, e.g., Mikayla Easley, Space Force Eyes In-Orbit Satellite Refueling, Propulsion Attachments for Mobility Gaps, DefenseScoop (Jan. 31, 2024), https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/31/space-force-satellite-refueling-backpack. The ability to refuel spacecrafts locally is essential for deep space exploration, a need that some governments have already recognized.51 See, e.g., ISAM Implementation Plan, supra note 16, at 5. Finally, lunar refueling stations – whether orbiting or ground-based – are poised to play an even more crucial role in the future of space exploration.52 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 5.

Particularly, lunar refueling offers the following benefits. First, it reduces dependency on Earth for resupply, which is critical for long-duration missions.53Id. at 30. By minimizing the need for spacecraft to carry all their fuel from Earth, lunar refueling alleviates the high launching costs and logistical complexities of Earth-based refueling.54A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 4. Second, lunar refueling extends mission capabilities and durations.55ISAM Implementation Plan, supra note 16, at 10. Instead of being constrained by the finite amount of fuel transported from Earth, spacecrafts can replenish their propellant on the Moon, enabling more prolonged exploration and comprehensive scientific research.56A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 6. Third, lunar refueling makes it possible to launch from the Moon itself, offering a significant reduction in launch costs.57Id. at 7. In fact, lunar launches bypass the need to escape Earth’s strong gravitational pull, benefiting from the Moon’s weaker gravity.58The Moon’s lower gravity makes launching from it considerably less demanding than launching from Earth’s surface. See, e.g., Jatan Mehta, Rocket equation 101: The Moon as a Launch Platform, Jatan’s Space (Jun 11, 2021), https://jatan.space/the-moon-as-a-rocket-platform (explaining that escaping Earth’s gravitation hold requires a tremendous amount of energy and that the energy needed for a rocket to ascend from Earth’s surface to a 250-kilometer orbit is nearly three times greater than the energy required for a journey from that orbit to the Moon. Similarly, reaching low Earth orbit demands twice as much energy as traveling from that orbit to Mars.).

C. The Extraction of Lunar Resources as Integral Part of the Lunar Refueling Industry

The lunar refueling industry is developing procedures to reduce logistical costs by utilizing in-situ resources.59 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 8. Hydrogen and oxygen derived from lunar water could become the backbone of a sustainable space economy.60Id. at 8-9. The envisioned infrastructure for producing and distributing propellants on the Moon relies on extracting water-ice from lunar craters, converting it into usable fuel, and setting up a logistical network to support missions across the inner Solar System.61Id. at 6. The process could begin with extracting water from ice deposits in the lunar polar regions,62Id. at 9. purifying it and then split it through electrolysis into liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX),63Id. which are both fuels prized for their efficiency in chemical propulsion.64Id. at 7. While hydrogen’s low density and challenging storage requirements pose difficulties, advancements in cryogenic fluid management and storage solutions could make hydrogen storage viable. Id.

The Moon is expected to act as a strategic hub for the rest of the Solar System, housing refueling depots and storage facilities that supply fuel for missions to Mars and beyond.65Id. at 8. The refueling network is expected to include “orbital gas stations” where fuel, derived from lunar water, is stored and transported across the inner Solar system.66Id. at 9. The infrastructure is expected to include tugs and transport vehicles to move fuel between depots and destinations, supporting long-term interplanetary missions while reducing dependence on Earth-based resources.67Id.

Considering the above scenario, lunar refueling will involve far more than just refueling stations; it will require an extensive and complex infrastructure encompassing extraction sites, refineries, pipelines, fuel depots, and maintenance facilities. These components and related activities, categorized as In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM), raise some environmental concerns (including those related to extraction sites, pipelines, and depots) and various legal challenges that require analysis. This Paper concentrates on legal issues,68See Part III. while an analysis of environmental issues is reserved for another day.69See Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, Lunar Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing; Legal and Environmental Issues, 57 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. (forthcoming, 2025).

II. The Legal Challenges Posed by the OST for Lunar Refueling and the Risk of Conflicts

Several legal issues arise from lunar refueling, the most important of which are with reference to the OST. This Paper argues they are all manageable.

A. Legal issues arising from Article II and Article IX of the OST

1. The potential impact of Article II of the OST on the development of the lunar refueling industry

Article II of the OST bars national appropriation of celestial bodies providing that “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”70OST, supra note 19, art. II. This provision presents two problematic perspectives for the lunar refueling industry: first, the issue of “appropriation” of lunar resources, which would be extracted to produce propellant and other fuels; and second, the occupation of lunar ground necessary for the operations.

First, while “[n]either the OST nor any other of the space treaties that implemented it –with the exception of the unsuccessful Moon Agreement –deal directly with space resource utilization,”71Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, Jurisdictional Choice for Space Resource Utilization Projects; Current Space Resource Utilization Laws, 22 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 1, 10 (2024). Giannoni-Crystal cites the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 I.L.M 1434, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement] and argues that the Moon Agreement has received very limited support, with only a small number of countries ratifying it since its adoption by the United Nations in 1979. the prevailing opinion among space-faring countries is that the use and appropriation of space resources is allowed under the OST.72Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 71, at 15-16. A few nations have issues laws governing the extraction and use of lunar resources,73Id. at 34 (listing the United Staes, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan). Brazil has also addressed space resource utilization within its general space law, Lei nº 14.946/2024 (the “Lei Geral de Atividades Espaciais”), enacted July 31, 2024, and effective August 1, 2024, which covers, in addition to exploration and use of celestial bodies and space resources, the development and operation of launch vehicles, satellites, stations, and related infrastructure; transport of people and materials to and from space; space tourism; orbital operations; and activities related to re-entry and recovery of space objects. The law was enacted with a presidential veto on the provision for automatic environmental licensing after a 60-day review period, but the rest of the regulatory structure remains intact. Luiza Melo, Lei que regulamenta atividades espaciais é sancionada com vetos, Agência Senado (Aug. 1, 2024), https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2024/08/01/lei-que-regulamenta-atividades-espaciais-e-sancionada-com-vetos-1. and the majority of scholars agree that the appropriation ban in Article II of the OST does not extend to extracted resources;74Id. at 14. this conclusion is based on a variety of reasons, including that Article I of the OST affirms the freedom to explore and utilize space.75See e.g., id. at 12-16.

Second, lunar refueling will require establishing infrastructure on the Moon’s surface,76Rafael Clemente, Helium-3: Mining the Fuel of the Future on the Moon, El País (May 11, 2024), https://english.elpais.com/science-tech/2024-05-12/helium-3-mining-the-fuel-of-the-future-on-the-moon.html. which could be seen as an appropriation. Even if such infrastructure, whether temporary or permanent, does not amount to a de jure appropriation, it may well be seen as a de facto appropriation, preventing others from accessing the same area or assert priority over certain locations, even without asserting exclusive ownership,77For instance, a circular array of interconnected solar panels powering a refueling facility could de facto prevent others from accessing the location. See e.g., Martin Elvis, et al., Concentrated Lunar Resources: Imminent Implications for Governance and Justice, 379 Phil. Trans. R. Soc’y 379 (2021). and thus raising issues with the OST’s non-appropriation principle.

Reference to the provision of Article XII of the OST could be used as a response to these issues because that provision seems to anticipate some level of occupation of land, and hence to legalize it.78Lachlan Blake, Jurisdiction on the Final Frontier: Facilities, Jurisdiction and Control in International Space Law, 46 Annals Air & Space L. 177, 196 (2021) (explaining that Article XII might essentially confer exclusive state jurisdiction on mining or extraction equipment, like drilling rigs that become part of a facility’s structure). In particular, Article XII requires that all facilities on the Moon or other celestial bodies be open to representatives from other Treaty parties, on a reciprocal basis, with advance notice, consultations, and proper safety measures in place.79OST, supra note 19, art. XII. The provision’s broad language suggests that states can exercise certain rights of control and jurisdiction over their facilities,80Blake, supra note 78, at 196. while its reference to “normal operations” implies that it encompasses all sorts of infrastructure, including refueling stations and other equipment.81See id. at 198 (discussing why “facility” is a more general term and “stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles” is not a close list). Therefore, Article XII could be read to sanction the legitimacy of lunar refueling stations and related facilities, like extraction sites, pipelines, and fuel depots. Since OST parties exercise jurisdiction and control over their facilities, lunar refueling stations fall under the oversight of their respective states, suggesting these installations should be considered legitimate under the OST framework. However, there are qualifications.

While Article XII supports the legitimacy of ISAM facilities, its requirements for advance notice, consultation, and safety measures82OST, supra note 19, art. XII. emphasize the need for cooperation among lunar stakeholders. Adhering to Article XII’s requirements is beneficial also to mitigate the potential for conflicts on the Moon.83Part II(B). If these requirements are ignored, perceived appropriation of lunar areas could lead to disputes. This Paper advocates for cooperation among stakeholders – specifically through the adoption of guidelines, shared infrastructure, and potentially network contracts84Part III.– as a means to mitigate conflicts and ensure adherence to both Article II and Article XII.

In conclusion, this Paper takes the position that not only the use of lunar resources for fuel and propellant production is consistent with the OST, but this is also the case for any occupation of lunar ground with refineries, piping, depots and other refueling facilities;85A different conclusion regarding the appropriation and use of resources for propellant production and ground occupation may be reached under the Moon Agreement, as its principles impose stricter international oversight. However, the Moon Agreement holds limited significance today, given its lack of adoption by major space-faring nations. Its “common heritage of mankind” principle and requirement for an international regime to manage lunar resources reflect ideals that have not been widely accepted. Consequently, the Agreement does not offer a persuasive basis to argue against national legislation on space mining. See Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 71, at 16; Moon Agreement, supra note 71. however, stakeholders’ coordination and cooperation is recommendable under the Treaty.

2. Do the Due Regard and the Avoidance of Harmful Interference Principles Impact Lunar Refueling Activities?

Another clause of the OST that could impact the lunar refueling industry is Article IX,86OST, supra note 19, art. IX. which establishes three distinct duties in performing space activities: (1) the duty to exercise “due regard” for the activities of others;87Art. IX, para. 1, provides:

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.

Id. (emphasis added).
(2) the duty to avoid harmful contamination;88Art. IX, para. 2, provides:

States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination . . .

Id. (emphasis added).
and (3) the duty to consult for coordination in cases where harmful interference is anticipated.89Art. IX, paras. 3-4, provide:

If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space  . . .would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties  . . . it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.

A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space  . . .would cause potentially harmful interference with activities  . . . may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

Id. (emphasis added).
This Paper does not address harmful contamination (as this provision is not directly relevant for lunar refueling),90As it aims to prevent the spread of biological contaminants from earth to outer space and the reverse, the relevance of Article IX’s prohibition of harmful contamination is limited in the context of lunar refueling operations, which focus on fuel production on the Moon rather than Earth-to-space transfers that might introduce biological contaminants. See, e.g., Jeb Butler, Note, Unearthly Microbes and the Laws Designed to Resist Them, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1355 (2007). (discussing the scope and intent of Article IX’s contamination provisions). and discusses whether the other two provisions of Article IX could raise insurmountable issues for lunar refueling.

Refueling activities, at any one of their stages, could damage or interference with sister refueling activities or other types of activities (e.g., scientific experiments). Resource extraction, pipeline construction, establishment of fuel depots, and other refueling-related operations, if located near existing operations, could adversely impact them.

Hence, could Article IX pose an obstacle to conducting refueling activities if such activities are likely to hinder other operations? It is unlikely, as the entire Article IX is expressed in broad and ambiguous terms, and state practice does not exist on these provisions.91Scholars agree the obligations arising from Article IX are “soft in nature” and expressed in vague terms. See, e.g., Neta Palkovitz, Exploring the Boundaries of Free Exploration and Use of Outer Space – Article IX and the Principle of Due Regard, Some Contemporary Considerations, 57 Proc. Int’l Inst. Space L. 93, 97 (2014). The language of the due regard principle is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether it directs states to refrain from a particular action altogether or simply to avoid carrying out that action in a specific manner. Id. at 101. Article IX mandates that contracting states carry out their activities with respect for the actions of others, but what does it mean exactly? The ambiguity of the provision suggests that it cannot be seen as an impediment to conflicting activities.92For an analysis of due regard see, e.g., Joanna Jarose, Giving Due Regard to the Obligation of ‘Due Regard’ Under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 24 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1 (2023). As for the harmful interference principle, it should be noted that it does not impose a strict obligation to prevent harmful interference or even an explicit duty to coordinate; it only establishes a right to consultation and a duty to consult in cases where potentially harmful interference is anticipated.93Article IX.

The generality of these provisions makes their application to specific scenarios of lunar refueling operations uncertain. However, for this very reason, it is unlikely that either of the obligations should be interpreted as prohibitive. The placement of a refueling station near other lunar activities – even if it poses operational challenges– does not violate these principles.

At the same time, the inability of these provisions to regulate damages and interferences could cause disputes (and in extreme cases, disruptive confrontations) among stakeholders, including those involved in refueling operations.94See, e.g., Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, Due Regard Does Not Grant a Legal Early Entrant Advantage, 18 Boletín del Observatorio Jurídico Aeroespacial (B.O.J.A.) (Apr. 2025), https://www.hispaviacion.es/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/BOLET%C3%8DN-AEDAE-ABRIL-2025-v2.pdf (discussing due regard and concluding that the principle only imposes a duty of coordination and should not be interpreted as to ban a later conflicting activity). This tension calls for cooperation among stakeholders to ensure that refueling services can coexist with other lunar endeavors without causing damage to others, excessive detrimental effects on the lunar environment, or conflicts.95Part II(B).

Nonetheless, there remain fundamental legal uncertainties surrounding lunar fueling operation. Imagine an explosion at a cryogenic depot that damages the lunar satellites of another stakeholder. How should the damage to the other party be approached? In the absence of clear precedent this is unclear. Potentially, the damaged party could pursue a state vs. state solution, i.e., seeking to have its state of incorporation to activate various frameworks under international public law.96This refers to:

(i) The framework of international wrongful act: if a damage is attributable to a state, either through direct involvement or if a private actor’s actions are attributable to that state under international law, this could be classified as an international wrongful act. A state’s failure to prevent harm from its nationals’ space activities could be seen as breaching treaty obligations or customary international law. See, e.g., OST, supra note 19. In such a case, the responsible state may face demands for reparations or diplomatic consequences, though this pathway remains largely untested.

(ii) The framework of state liability under OST, art. VII and the Liability Convention (Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.). OST, art. VII, along with the Liability Convention, provides a basis for states to be held internationally liable for damage caused by space activities, even if conducted by private entities. This would apply if the explosion causes “measurable damages” to another state’s interests or to international space infrastructure. The injured state could pursue compensation from the state responsible for the activity. However, the Liability Convention lacks a concrete enforcement mechanism, and there is no established state practice clarifying fault-based liability on the Moon. Under the Liability Convention, a launching State holds absolute liability only for damage caused on Earth’s surface or to aircraft in flight. Id., art. II. In contrast, for damage occurring elsewhere, such as on the Moon, liability is fault-based and requires proving fault by the launching State or its responsible parties. Id. art. III. Also, it remains unclear whether this Convention would apply to space objects assembled on the Moon—such as the cryogenic depot in our example—rather than those launched from Earth, as the Liability Convention focuses on “launching States” and space objects “launched into outer space,” which assumes an Earth-based origin.

(iii) Non-escalatory conflict resolution, seeking remedies through diplomatic channels, such as negotiation or mediation, which could help resolve conflicts without escalation to armed conflict. The application of this pathway – which was taken between Canada and the Soviet Union in the Cosmos 954 incident event – to the Moon would need to be explored.
Alternatively, it could pursue a private vs. private route.97The reference here is to civil actions being pursued by the affected party against the tortfeasor in the event of damage to or interference with its activities (as in the case of an explosion of cryogenic depot). While it would seem theoretically possible for the affected party to pursue damage claims (for example using negligence principles or product liability), there are significant legal uncertainties (e.g., applicable law, as well as jurisdiction) and practical enforcement problems. The novelty of lunar industrial activities makes these pathways speculative, underscoring the need for discussion as lunar operations and litigation advance.

B. Potential for Conflicts Among Lunar Stakeholders Including in Connection to Lunar Refueling

Potential conflicts on the Moon may arise for three main reasons. Firstly, a growing number of nations and private entities are advancing lunar projects, leading to the risk of overcrowding and competition. Secondly, prime locations on the Moon are limited, heightening interest in and competition over specific areas. Thirdly, differing interpretations of space law, particularly regarding Article II, contribute to potential disputes.98For a broader discussion of how the Moon could soon become a hotbed of conflicts, see Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, The Legality of Defending National Activities on the Moon, 16 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 137 (2025).

Some recent studies discuss the potential for conflicts on the Moon because of interference and overcrowding.99See, e.g., Leonard David, Our Moon: Risks of Crowding and Interference, Inside Outer Space (Feb. 28, 2023) https://www.leonarddavid.com/our-moon-risks-of-crowding-and-interference (arguing that in the upcoming decade, the potential for interference, disputes, and conflicts may increase as various actors, including sovereign, philanthropic, and commercial entities, converge on a few lunar sites); Caleb White, Earth, Moon’s Cislunar Space Is Becoming Overcrowded, May Result in War, Science Times (Jan. 24, 2023, 08:09 AM), https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/42009/20230124/earth-moons-cislunar-space-becoming-overcrowded-result-war-report.htm (arguing that cislunar space is becoming “overcrowded”). Given the significant number of planned lunar projects – of which refueling projects represent only a fraction – conflicts among lunar stakeholders are a real possibility. Areas of interest on the Moon are limited, and upcoming missions are expected to focus on a few specific sites.100Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 98, at 144. As on Earth, lunar resources are unevenly distributed, and not all locations are equally suited for every activity.101Id. at 144–45. Finally, current lunar resource mapping lacks resolution, meaning resource-rich areas might be smaller or more concentrated than estimated.102Elvis, et al., supra note 77, at 8.

A couple of examples of prime locations. The Peaks of Eternal Light (“PELs”) near the lunar poles are coveted sites for many activities,103Id. at 4. including refueling-related activities. These locations are advantageous for the refueling industry because the abundance of water (which is crucial for fuel production) in the adjacent permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) –which makes the PRSs important for fuel generation, as the ice can be split into hydrogen and oxygen; this renders the PELs also strategic for fuel production: PELs, offering near-continuous sunlight, offer stable solar power, which can be used to supports solar-powered infrastructure for extracting and splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen through electrolysis in PSRs,104Elvis et al., supra note 77, at 7. as has already been recognized for planning purposes by many future lunar stakeholders.105NASA’s Artemis program, as well as missions from JAXA and ISRO, are eyeing the rim of Shackleton Crater and similar areas because of this exact energy–resource pairing. See NASA, NASA Identifies Candidate Regions for Landing Next Americans on Moon (Aug. 19, 2022), https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-identifies-candidate-regions-for-landing-next-americans-on-moon; Indian Defence News, Scientists Narrow Down on Landing Site at Lunar South Pole for ISRO-JAXA LUPEX Mission (Feb. 12, 2024), https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2024/02/scientists-narrow-down-on-landing-site.html; see also A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 6. Competition and interferences can easily ensue in these areas.

The Far Side of the Moon is also regarded as a prime site for many activities.106Elvis et al., supra note 77, at 7. Smooth terrains there provide ideal sites for radio-quiet zones and cosmological telescopes, but only six areas (such as Mare Moscoviensis and Mendeleev) offer the necessary extensive terrain.107Id. at 5-6. These same areas also contain high concentrations of helium-3, a potential fuel for nuclear fusion.108Id. at 16. However, this dual appeal is problematic, as mining and astronomical activities often conflict, increasing the likelihood of disputes.109Id. at 6.

Sinus Medii is the prime candidate for positioning a lunar elevator to the Earth–Moon Lagrange L1 point (“L1”), as well as for installing an antenna to receive microwave power from a potential solar power station at L1.110Id. at 7. Lipskiy Crater is an ideal location for situating a lunar elevator to the Earth–Moon L2 point.111Id. Given their strategic locations, it is likely that many entities, including lunar refueling companies, will seek to utilize these two areas. For example, both offer convenient access for connecting with cryogenic propellant refineries and depots to be positioned in stable orbits around the Moon.112 A Vision for Humanity’s Future in Space, supra note 3, at 5.

With multiple stakeholders targeting these limited, high-value areas for a number of purposes, congestion, interference, and resource disputes seem almost inevitable.113Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 98, at 144. Refueling will be part of the congestion and could create interferences. For example, the extraction of helium3 – which could be used for fusion-based spacecraft propulsion,114See, e.g., Helium-3: Potential Fuel for the Space Economy, New Space Economy, https://newspaceeconomy.ca/2024/02/26/helium-3-potential-fuel-for-the-space-economy (last visited May 21, 2025) (stating that “Helium-3 fusion reactors could power highly efficient spacecraft propulsion systems, drastically reducing travel times within the solar system and enabling ambitious crewed missions to Mars and beyond.”) and is present in high density only in a few regions–115Elvis, et al., supra note 77, at 7. can interfere with planned scientific infrastructures, such as telescopes, because it can affect sensitive equipment.116Id. In addition, there are potential environmental issues associated with mining, including for fuel production. For instance, extracting certain resources found in specific lunar areas (such as thorium, uranium, and particularly helium-3) carries pollution risks, either from dust or byproducts. Id.

In addition, there are potential environmental issues associated with mining, including for fuel production. For instance, extracting certain resources found in specific lunar areas (such as thorium, uranium, and particularly helium-3) carries pollution risks,117Id. either from dust or byproducts. This activity may also lead to conflicts.

The mere occupation of lunar ground for extractions sites (which will be extensive),118See Clemente, supra note 76 (arguing that “the production of lunar water in industrial quantities will require large-scale facilities”). pipelines, fuel depots, and other facilities could by itself lead to conflicts with other lunar stakeholders. Indeed, such installations may be viewed – as discussed119See Part II(A). – as a de facto appropriation of lunar ground, as they may restrict other stakeholders’ access to the same areas, even without a formal claim of exclusive ownership.120As an example of how conflicts could develop, consider situations where activities are impeded by “technologically justifiable means.” See Elvis, et al., supra note 77, at 11. Instead of physical barriers, lunar miners could use legitimate alternatives, like encircling excavation zones with solar panels and cables, effectively controlling access. Id. This could escalate, with others developing methods to bypass these setups, leading to a potential “arms race” of countermeasures. Id. The construction of these facilities can cause tensions that might even culminate in violence or armed conflicts.121See, e.g., Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 98 (arguing that a de facto appropriation of an area of the Moon could generate conflicts).

The solutions proposed in Part III – cooperation, guidelines, shared facilities, and lunar network contracts – could constitute effective measures to reduce the conflicts described above. To be clear, these proposals differ fundamentally from the regime envisioned under the Moon Agreement.122Moon Agreement, supra note 71, at 13. While the Moon Agreement calls for a centralized international authority and a redistributive “common heritage” framework,123Id. art. 11; see John S. Goehring, The Moon Agreement and the Prospect of Commercial Exploitation of Lunar Resources, 11 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 573, 579–80 (2021) (“[C]ommon heritage of mankind” is a concept which “lacks a precise definition but basically wishes to convey the idea that management, exploitation, and distribution of the natural resources of the area in question are matters to be decided upon by the international community and are not to be left to the initiative and discretion of individual States and their nationals.”). the mechanisms proposed in Part III are voluntary, industry-driven, and grounded in mutual economic benefits; they are intended to foster practical cooperation rather than impose centralized governance. They do not require global consensus or legally binding international commitments, but can be implemented pragmatically through stakeholder collaboration, incentivized by national licensing regimes, market efficiency, and contractual arrangements.

III. Proposed Solutions

A. Guidelines for the Lunar Refueling Industry

As the complexities of lunar operations may call for a framework to promote responsible activity and common practices by stakeholders, this paper suggests adoption of voluntary guidelines. Given the discussed improbability of creating new treaties or modifying existing ones in the near term,124Melissa J. Durkee, Interstitial Space Law, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 423, 427 (2019) (arguing that this is “an era of nationalist retraction, where major multilateral treaty regimes are facing existential threats”). developing comprehensive guidelines appears to be the best approach to foster safe, sustainable, and ideally conflict-free activities.125This Paper maintains that guidelines are the most practical path forward. Hypothetically, should formal agreements or internationally adopted documents become possible at all, they will likely concern areas of leading space powers’ common interests, potentially including lunar refueling. This Paper argues, however, that this is uncertain, while time is of the essence as activities on the Moon are already beginning to take shape, and the absence of clear guidance risks fragmentation, operational inefficiencies, and potential conflicts. The ISAM Implementation Plan indirectly acknowledges this need, encouraging international cooperation on guidelines and norms.126ISAM Implementation Plan, supra note 16, at 9. These guidelines should outline explicit rules, incorporate ethical standards, and set expectations for lunar stakeholders, addressing legal uncertainties. Envisioned as a non-binding set of principles, these guidelines could be voluntarily adopted or recommended by industry associations such as the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA),127See Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), https://www.aia-aerospace.org. the Commercial Spaceflight Federation,128See Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF), https://commercialspace.org. or national coalitions like the Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM Capabilities (COSMIC),129See Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM Capabilities (COSMIC), https://cosmicspace.org. which is spearheading efforts to make ISAM a routine part of space architectures. They could also be integrated into domestic laws in various countries. Rather than a rigid code of conduct, these guidelines would offer flexible recommendations and best practices. The Artemis Accords,130The Artemis Accords, Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf. along with select elements from the Building Blocks131The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group, Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework for the Governance of Space Resource Activities (Apr. 2019), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht–en-ruimterecht/space-resources/revised-building-blocks-following-the-meeting-of-april-2019.pdf. that emphasize stakeholder cooperation and transparency, could inform the development of these lunar refueling guidelines, which should be flexible to accommodate changes as activities evolve.

B. Cooperative Models

With the emergence of a lunar economy, addressing the legal and factual challenges discussed above is crucial to ensure the viability of lunar refueling activities and their sustainability – meaning the ability to continue them indefinitely132See, e.g., Centre for Advanced Instrumentation, Space Sustainability, https://www.durham.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/advanced-instrumentation/research/research-areas/space-science/space-sustainability (explaining that COPUOS defines long-term sustainability of space activities as the ability to continue them indefinitely, ensuring equitable access to space benefits for peaceful purposes while preserving the space environment for future generations). – and to support expansion of lunar commercial activity, including refueling.133See, e.g., Tiffany Chow & Brian Weeden, An Introduction to Ostrom’s Eight Principles for Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources as a Possible Framework for Sustainable Governance of Space, https://swfound.org/media/61531/isusymposium2012paper_tchowbweeden.pdf (highlighting the necessity for sustainable practices to prevent space from becoming prohibitively expensive or risky, and advocating for adaptive governance to address evolving conditions in the space environment while tackling common-pool resource issues for long-term sustainability). This Paper suggests that cooperation among lunar refueling stakeholders is crucial to address legal uncertainties and reduce the likelihood of conflicts.

The ISAM Strategy emphasizes the importance of coordination among stakeholders,134ISAM Strategy, supra note 17, at 6 (emphasizing the need for better coordination among stakeholders; aiming to enhance collaboration within the government and with academic, commercial, and international partners to advance ISAM capabilities and maintain global leadership). as does the ISAM Implementation Plan.135ISAM Implementation Plan, supra note 16, at 9. Section 4.1 of the ISAM Implementation Plan highlights the role of international cooperation in developing guidelines and best practices for responsible space activities,136Id. while Section 4.5 promotes international collaboration that aligns with U.S. laws, regulations, and policies.137Id. Additionally, Section 4.6 suggests exploring arrangements for appropriate access to testing facilities on Earth and in space.138Id. To be clear, while this Paper does not propose that the guidelines be adopted by international organizations or their committees –such as COPUOS (the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space)139United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. – as doing so would likely require a consensus that is difficult to achieve in the near term, the guidelines should remain open to collaboration or adoption by industry associations, foreign companies and any type of lunar stakeholders; broad participation beyond domestic actors should be encouraged.

1. Shared Refueling Facilities and Resource Pooling

In light of the need for cooperation among stakeholders to establish refueling stations that are both efficient and sustainable, collaboration could take the form of shared lunar facilities or pooled resources, both of which offer practical approaches. Consistent with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 10-Year Lunar Architecture Capability Study’s (LunA-10) emphasis on reducing the lunar footprint and creating scalable, interoperable systems rather than isolated missions,140Why the Department of Defense is funding lunar architecture, Astralytical (Feb. 5, 2024), https://astralytical.substack.com/p/why-the-department-of-defense-is? (discussing the exploration announcement for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the 10-Year Lunar Architecture Capability Study (LunA-10)). this Paper advocates for a shared infrastructure model in which refueling companies share facilities (e.g., extraction facilities) to reduce the high costs associated with individual operations but also to prevent competition for prime locations among stakeholders.141The theory that lunar refueling stakeholders should share resources is demonstrated, albeit indirectly, by a theoretical model for suborbital docking and refueling known as “MUST” (Multipurpose Space Transport), supported by Excel-based performance comparisons. The architecture relies on coordinated in-flight refueling and multi-vehicle operations to achieve orbital insertion and, ultimately, lunar access. While the analysis focuses on suborbital and Earth-orbit operations, it illustrates the broader value of modular, cooperative infrastructure, an approach that aligns with the principles of shared resource use in a future lunar refueling network. See Francis Chastaing, A Unified Theory of Suborbital Docking and Refueling, The Space Rev. (Jan. 15, 2024), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4898/1. Finally, while this Paper does not delve into the environmental risks of the lunar refueling industry, it offers a limited observation that shared facilities may help reduce surface disruption,142To mitigate the “plume effect” that can arise during lunar landings, scholars propose constructing shared landing pads using local materials, similar to terrestrial airports, to contain regolith spray and reduce potential damage to equipment. Michelle L. D. Hanlon & Bailey Cunningham, The Legal Imperative to Mitigate the Plume Effect: An Aggravation and Frustration That Imperils Our History and Our Future, 43 J. Space L. 309, 340 (2019). Likewise, shared refueling facilities would limit environmental impacts, decrease regolith disturbances, protect heritage sites, and prevent conflicts over optimal locations on the Moon. Id. by reducing the number of potentially disruptive facilities on the lunar surface.

The concept of shared production facilities has been recognized as efficient and economically advantageous over the ages in cultures as diverse as ancient Greece (Communal bread ovens) and Renaissance Europe (shared workshops),143Sheilagh Ogilvie, The Economics of Guilds, 28 J. Econ. Persp. 169 (2014); Mariana Kavroulaki, Ovens, History of Greek Food (May 26, 2012), https://1historyofgreekfood.wordpress.com/2012/05/26/ovens. modern Israel (kibbutzim),144See, e.g., Enfu Cheng & Yexia Sun, Israeli Kibbutz: A Successful Example of Collective Economy, 6 World Rev. Pol. Econ. 160 (2015). the United States (shared warehouses),145See Learn the Benefits of Shared Warehousing, Ryder (Jan. 25, 2024), https://www.ryder.com/en-us/insights/blogs/e-comm/what-are-shared-warehouses. and contemporary Italy (oil mills).146See Vincenzo Zerilli, Frantoi aziendali a confronto. Pregi e difetti, caratteristiche e qualche riflessione per compiere una scelta consapevole, che sia davvero a misura d’impresa, Teatro Naturale (May 26, 2007), https://www.teatronaturale.it/strettamente-tecnico/l-arca-olearia/3685-frantoi-aziendali-a-confronto-pregi-e-difetti-caratteristiche-e-qualche-riflessione-per-compiere-una-scelta-consapevole-che-sia-davvero-a-misura-da.htm. Scholars argue that shared production facilities optimize resources, improve market access, and foster collaboration among entities.147See Pingyu Jiang & Putin Li, Shared factory: A new production node for social manufacturing in the context of sharing economy, 234 J. Eng. Manu. 285 (2019). Applying this shared infrastructure model to lunar refueling industry, stakeholders could benefit from centralized extraction sites, common pipelines, shared propellant depot, and collaborative maintenance hubs. Economically, shared lunar refueling facilities would reduce costs for stakeholders by distributing the burden of constructing and maintaining independent facilities. They could also foster international cooperation, avoid monopolization of lunar resources, and encourage peaceful collaboration. Such facilities could promote sustainable lunar development while mitigating risks associated with individual installations, like accidental damage to heritage sites.148For a discussion of the need to preserve lunar heritage, see, e.g., Michelle Hanlon, “Due Regard” for Commercial Space Must Start with Historic Preservation, 9 Global Bus. L. Rev. 130 (2021).

Cooperation among refueling service providers could extend to pooling resources and capacities, i.e., combining the capabilities of multiple facilities through shared inventory.149See Jiang & Li, supra note 147, at 290. Terrestrial industries with high resource demands and costly downtimes, such as aviation, are exploring resource pooling. 150Siavash H. Khajavi & Jan Holmström, Production Capacity Pooling in Additive Manufacturing: Possibilities and Challenges, in 513 Advances in Production Management Systems 501, 501, 504 (Hermann Lödding et al., eds., 2017) (noting, however, that the biggest players tend to acquire or construct their own networked capacity pool and not get involved in pooling arrangements with smaller players). On the Moon, resource pooling can both address potential supply shortages in lunar operations – where isolated facilities might face critical deficits in fuel, spare parts, or equipment – and can also offer environmental benefits, as it may reduce the frequency of rocket launches, excavation, and transport, decrease emissions and energy consumption, and mitigate the risk of generating space debris by lowering the number of landings.

How can we achieve the goal of lunar stakeholders using shared facilities or pooling resource together? One promising approach is to integrate these requirements into the licensing framework for lunar activities. Currently, the United States lacks a licensing system for lunar activities.151During the last administration, two competing bills on mission authorization were proposed, but neither was passed. See, e.g., Theresa Hitchens, White House asks Congress to split ‘new space’ authority between Commerce, Transportation, Breaking Defense (Nov. 15, 2023, 9:00 AM), https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/white-house-asks-congress-to-split-new-space-authority-between-commerce-transportation. To date, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has issued licenses for ISAM activities such as docking and life extension (e.g., MEV-1 and MEV-2), but these missions did not involve actual propellant transfer. The chemical fuel remained onboard the servicing vehicle, and no regulatory framework has yet addressed the complexities of transferring stored energy or fuel between spacecraft. See In the Matter of Space Innovation; Facilitating Capabilities for In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 24-21, ¶ 6 (Mar. 14, 2024), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-21A1.pdf. The FCC has proposed an ISAM licensing framework (still under review as of June 2025) to establish a regulatory structure for licensing space stations engaged in ISAM. Space Innovation; Facilitating Capabilities for In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing, 89 Fed. Reg. 18,875 (Mar. 15, 2024). While the framework may eventually provide a pathway for authorizing certain servicing activities, as it would apply to orbiting refueling stations, it would not extend to lunar surface refueling, which falls outside the scope of the proposed rule. Also, the proposed framework would apply only to communications functions, consistent with the FCC’s statutory mandate. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301, 303. In establishing one, the United States could consider using the licensing procedure to encourage these arrangements. An alternative, a voluntary-based method to encourage this structure would be to offer incentives such as tax breaks or regulatory preferences, enabling the government to promote shared infrastructures and resource pooling. Finally, space associations can help catalyze the broader adoption of shared facilities and pooled-resource frameworks through strategic coordination and sustained engagement with their members.152See supra notes 127-29.

2. Network Contracts

“Network contracts” (contratto di rete), established under Italian law, provide a flexible framework for collaborative operations by independent companies within a coordinated network.153Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili del Triveneto & Retimpresa, Linee Guida per i contratti di rete [Guidelines for Network Contracts], (Mar. 2012), https://www.pv.camcom.it/files/SPRI/2012-03%20Reteimpresa%20-%20Linee%20guida%20per%20i%20contratti%20di%20rete.pdf. The legal nature of “contratto di rete” – Article 3, paragraph 4-ter and following of Decree Law No. 5/2009 and subsequent amendments – is subject to differing interpretations, with some seeing it as a new and distinct type of contract and others viewing it as a set of requirements that enables cooperation agreements among businesses to access certain advantages. Id. at 1. See also William B. Bierce, Multiparty Contractual Networks: New Tool for Global Entrepreneurship and Supply Chains, 20 Bus. L. Int’l 249, 260-61 (2019). Designed to facilitate production and distribution among business districts, these contracts enable companies to benefit from economies of scale and respond to globalization’s demands.154Guidelines for Network Contracts, supra note 153, at 4. Networks can take various forms – organizational, contractual, or mixed –155Id. at 4. depending on their structure and include elements like strategic objectives, decision-making processes,156Id. at 5. and, optionally, a common fund and a dispute resolution body.157Id. Central to a network is the so-called “network program” (programma di rete), which outlines the participants’ rights and obligations, as well as the methods for pursuing the common purpose.158Id. at 20.

Network contracts could prove highly beneficial for lunar refueling operations, fostering collaboration, resource sharing, and flexible adaptation to evolving conditions on the Moon. Similar to the Italian model, lunar networks could consist of independent entities in the lunar refueling industry bound by a network program detailing objectives, rights, and obligations specific to refueling activities. Lunar stakeholders could structure these networks as consortia, joint ventures, or other agreements based on their preferences.

These networks could serve to implement shared refueling stations, where participating companies could pool expertise, resources, and testing capabilities, reducing costs and supporting efficient lunar refueling activities. The benefits of lunar networks may include: (1) collective expertise and resource sharing; (2) enhanced compliance with OST provisions; (3) improved coordination of resources; (4) reduction of environmental impact and of risks for lunar heritage sites; (5) sustainability.

Similarly to shared facilities, the adoption of a network contract could either be mandated or encouraged. Mandating could involve embedding it within the licensing framework for lunar refueling services, making network participation a licensing requirement. Encouraging could mean incentivizing it through regulatory or tax benefits. Alternatively, network contracts could be incorporated into arrangements like the Artemis Accords to promote uniform standards among participants. Industry associations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the space associations mentioned above,159See supra notes 127-29. could further support the adoption of network contracts by highlighting their advantages to their members and encouraging industry-wide compliance.

Conclusion

As humanity establishes a permanent presence on the Moon, lunar refueling will become increasingly important, with the potential to transform the Moon into a strategic gateway for deep-space exploration, paving the way for missions to Mars, the asteroids, and beyond. This Paper has discussed certain legal issues arising from the OST and concluded that they are manageable. It has also considered how lunar refueling, like other ISAM activities on the Moon, could stir up conflicts among stakeholders. To address the legal concerns and mitigate potential conflicts, the Paper proposes solutions based on cooperation and coordination among the stakeholders, as well as the development of industry-driven guidelines. These solutions may not satisfy those who maintain a strong belief that formal international agreements remain a viable and necessary path forward. This Paper rejects that view. In the current geopolitical environment, the negotiation of new treaties or amendments to existing ones appears increasingly unlikely. Accordingly, the proposed mechanisms (voluntary guidelines, cooperative models, and network contracts) offer a pragmatic, industry-driven, adaptable approach grounded in mutual benefits and stakeholder initiative, with the added potential to reduce environmental impact by promoting resource sharing and minimizing redundant infrastructure. The uncertainties surrounding lunar activities demand solutions that can be implemented in the near term, as commercial operations are beginning to take shape. This Paper has outlined potential solutions grounded in cooperation, adaptability, and stakeholder initiative.


* Francesca Giannoni-Crystal is an international lawyer practicing with Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal LLC, with two JDs (University of Florence, Italy and Charleston School of Law) and an LLM in Space Law (summa cum laude) from the University of Mississippi School of Law. She assists companies in several industries including aerospace and defense. She wants to thank Matt Blaszczyk, managing editor of the Journal of Law and Mobility for his helpful comments, Italian attorney Eva Bredariol, who inspired the idea of the network contracts for the Moon, and her law partner Prof. Nathan M. Crystal, whose support and encouragement make her scholarship possible.

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